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Notes
CIVIL PROCEDURE-INSURANCE COMPANIES AS
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
The purposes of this note are twofold. One purpose is to analyze
critically three legal relationships, one or another of which arises be-
tween an insurance company and its insured every time an action is
brought against a third party primarily liable for the loss sustained.
These relationships to be examined from the procedural standpoint
of the insurance company as a party to the action arise as follows:
1. In case of full assignment by the insured.
2. In case of partial assignment by the insured.
3. Under a loan arrangement between insurer and insured. The
second purpose is to evaluate these three legal relationships in light
of the policy against the interjection of the existence of insurance into
a jury trial.
Full Assignment by the Insured
The first situation governing the insurer's status in the litigation is
determined by an affirmative answer to the following question. Was
the insured fully reimbursed for all the damages sought in the action,
resulting in either an actual assignment or, as a matter of law, a
subrogation of his whole claim to the insurer?' If so, the insurer and
only the insurer can bring the action as he is the sole real party in
interest. This is the rule in most states having a real party in interest
statute2 and became the rule in Kentucky in 1950 when such was
clearly set forth in the case of Works v. Winkle.3 This case arose out
of an automobile collision and involved a plaintiff who carried a one
hundred dollar deductible collision insurance policy. The insurer and
the plaintiff, its insured, fixed the latter's damages at $900.00 where-
upon the insurer paid to the insured $800.00 and received in return
an assignment of the right of recovery from the tortfeasor to the extent
of the $800.00.4 Action against the tortfeasor was then brought in the
I For the purpose of this note the words assignment and subrogation will be
used interchangeably as they have the same legal effect upon the real party in
interest question as far as the writer can determine from the Kentucky cases. For
further discussion of this point and of the subject of this note see Clark and
Hutchins, "The Real Party In Interest," 34 Yale L.J. 259 (1925).
2 Id. at 266.
3 234 S.W. 2d 312 (Ky. 1950).
4 Though the title of this section is "Full Assignment by the Insured" and
the case under discussion involves a partial assignment, the case is cited for its
dictum.
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name of the insured requesting damages of $1135.00, $135.00 of which
was for loss of use of the automobile during the period of repair.
Verdict was rendered and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. But,
upon introduction of evidence of the assignment, the lower court set
aside the judgment on the grounds of fraud in that the insurer, not the
insured, was the real party in interest.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals on reinstating the original judg-
ment discussed the past Kentucky cases involving the failure of sub-
rogated insurance companies to join in actions by their policyholders.
The Court relied upon the earliest Kentucky case on the subject, Illinois
Cent. Ry. v. Hicklin,5 as authority for its holding that a partial as-
signor may sue to recover the whole claim. However, by way of dictum
the Works opinion modified dictum in the Hicklin case. According to
Hicklin case, where there is an assignment of the insured's cause of
action the defendant has no right to insist on being faced by the
insurer "if the defendant will be protected in a payment to or a
recovery by him [the insured]." The Hicklin decision made no dis-
tinction between partial and full assignments of the claim but con-
tained the following unqualified language:
The fact, however, that a third party might be entitled to the damages
as between him and plaintiffs, is not sufficient to bar the right of
action by the plaintiffs. The legal title to the property destroyed was
in the plaintiffs. As between the plaintiffs and defendant the former
were the real parties in interest.6
The Works decision, after quoting the above excerpt from the
Hicklin case, went on to withdraw from the effect of the statement
the full assignment situations. Relying on an intervening case, Monson
v. Payne,7 the Works decision set up the present rule that where the
whole cause of action has been assigned prior to the institution of the
action it must be brought in the name of the assignee. But the writer
takes issue with the Court's reliance on Monson v. Payne for authority,
as that case is distinguishable on its facts. The Court in that decision
had no intention of bringing about so severe a modification of the
unambiguous words, quoted above, from the Hicklin. opinion. In the
Monson case the plaintiffs' partially insured property had been set
afire by sparks from defendant's locomotive. Having obtained partial
reimbursement for their damages from their insurers, plaintiffs re-
ceived compensation for the remainder of their damages in a settle-
ment with the defendant-railroad in which settlement plaintiffs re-
5 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (1909).
OId. at 630, 115 S.W. at 753.
7 199 Ky. 105, 250 S.W. 799 (1923).
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leased all claims against the railroad growing out of the fire. Sub-
sequently, the insurer in the insured's name brought action against the
railroad for the damages sustained by the insurers. The high Court
held that because the plaintiffs had received full payment for their
losses and had executed a release to the defendant, the action should
be maintained in the name of the subrogated insurers. In the body of
the Monson case the Court distinguished that case from the Hicklin
case not on the grounds that the plaintiffs had been made whole, but
on the basis of the fact that they had given complete "acquittance"
to the defendant of any further liability.8
Nevertheless, in the Works opinion the full assignment rule was
unequivocally stated as a guide to future litigation. The following
words were used:
Where an assignment of the whole cause of action has been made
previous to the institution of the action, the action must be com-
menced in the name of the assignee. .. .9
Partial Assignment by the Insured
A second situation, one touched upon above, in which an insurance
company may be named as a party to the action, whether or not it so
desires, occurs when its status is that of a partial assignee. This status
can come about where the injured insured holds a deductible policy
in which case upon reimbursement by the insurer and assignment to
him of the right of recovery to the extent of the payment, the insured
retains the right to recovery to the amount deducted. Another way in
which the partial assignee status may appear is where the insurance
protection is less than the damage done to the insured property or
where some of the property damaged was not insured at all.
At any rate, whenever the insured's claim is for more than the
policy covers, the insurer as a partial assignee can recover for the part
assigned in the same or separate action as that brought by the assignor
should the latter sue only for the part unassigned.' 0 Or the Court will
allow the insured-assignor to sue for the whole claim if recovery by
him will be a bar to the insurer's right of action for the part assigned."1
Such was clearly set forth in the Works decision as a guide to future
litigation and is well supported by prior Kentucky cases cited in that
opinion.
However, a further modification of this partial assignment rule
8 Id. at 110, 250 S.W. at 802.
9 Works v. Winkle, 2.34 S.W. 2d 312, 316 (Ky. 1950).
10~avlr Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W. 2d 7 (1941);
accord, Works v. Winle, 234 S.W. 2d 312, 316 (Ky. 1950).
"1Works v. Winkle, supra note 10 at 316.
[Vol. 46,
NoTEs
came in the 1954 case of Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mack Mfg.
Corp.'2 The case involved a collision between a train and a truck,
and the action was brought by the truck owner against the railroad
after he had been compensated for all his damages less one hundred
dollars under a one hundred dollar deductible collision policy. The
railroad in its pleadings questioned the truckowner's status as the real
party in interest asserting that he had been reimbursed and had
executed an assignment of the entire cause of action to his insurer.
The Court of Appeals found the assignment was only a partial one
but went on to alter the seemingly unqualified right of the partial
assignor to seek full recovery in his own name. The opinion read:
Where the [partial] assignor has brought suit for the entire claim
(thus not splitting the cause of action) the defendant would have
the right to insist upon application of the real party in interest rule
by moving that the assignee be made a party and assert his claim.13
The Court treated the railroad's pleading as a motion to join the
insurance company, reversed the $4,500 judgment for the truck-owner,
and made what appears to be new law in Kentucky, new law based
on Rule 17.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure specifying
that all actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. This rule has been in existence in Kentucky for years, 14 but
it was not until the Mack decision that it was invoked to require
joinder of partially subrogated insurance companies upon motion of
the defendant.
The Loan Agreement
A third position of an insurance company in regard to the real
party in interest rule involves the loan agreement, which is in sub-
stance the same as an assignment but legally is recognized and
treated somewhat differently in Kentucky. The loan agreement is a
transaction in which the insurer "lends" to the insured the amount of
his damages protected by the policy in return for the insured's promise
to institute action in his own name for the insurer's benefit against the
third party responsible for the loss. No interest is charged and the in-
sured is obligated to repay the loan only to the extent of his recovery
S12269 S.W. 2d 707 (Ky. 1954); accord, Bratton v. Speaks, 286 S.W. 2d 526
(Ky. 1956); and C. D. Herme Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W. 2d 534 (Ky.
1956).
1 3 Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mack Mfg. Co., 269 S.W. 2d 707, 709 (Ky.
1954).
14 The rule that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest can be found in see. 30 of the original Kentucky Code of Civil Practice
adopted by the Legislature in March 1851, later changed to sec. 18 of Carroll's
Kentucky Code of Civil Practice, and now found in Rule 17.01 of Kentucky's Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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from the third party. This agreement was first acknowledged in Ken-
tucky as a valid avoidance of the real party in interest rule in State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hall, a 1942 case.15 The action was in-
stituted to determine whether the owner's or the driver's automobile
insurer was liable for a wrongful death judgment. The owner's in-
surer entered into a loan agreement with the driver whereby the latter
was able to pay off the judgment rendered against him. As provided in
the agreement, the driver then instituted action against his own in-
surer who alleged in his answer that the driver had been made whole
"under the pretense of a loan" and "had no interest whatever in this
action."16 The Court, noting that there were no domestic cases on the
question, relied upon foreign authority for its holding that the loan
did not amount to an absolute payment or an outright satisfaction of
the insured's loss but must be treated as a loan since such was the in-
tention of the parties which, according to the Court, is the determhining
factor. This rule was reaffirmed recently in Aetna Freight Lines, Inc.
v. R. C. Tway Co.17 where a similar loan agreement was executed in
anticipation of a recovery from a third party tortfeasor. The only
relevant distinction ascertained by the Court between the two cases
is that in the State Farm case the insurance policy involved contained
an express provision that the insurer was liable only for the insured's
actual damages and, therefore, would not be required to pay damages
which the insured recovered from third parties. While the policy in
the Aetna case contained no such provision, the Kentucky Court im-
plied it and again enunciated the proposition that if the parties in-
tended to execute a loan, which they undoubtedly did in order to
avoid the real party in interest rule, then it will be recognized as such.
Without going into the question of the desirability of the result in
the loan agreement cases, it is difficult to see why a loan agreement
excuses an insurance company from the role of real party in interest
when an assignment or subrogation casts the role upon the company
whether it wants it or not. In all three situations the insurer is the
beneficial owner of part or all of the recovery from the third party. On
the other hand, if the Court does not consider payment on the policy
absolute in the loan agreement cases, then payment cannot be con-
sidered absolute upon executing an assignment. In both instances a
promise of refund is exacted which is conditioned upon the happening
of the same event, a recovery elsewhere. But the Court treated the
similar transactions differently, basing its distinctions on form rather
15 292 Ky. 22, 165 S.W. 2d 838 (1942).
16 Id. at 25, 165 S.W. 2d at 840.
17 298 S.W. 2d 293 (Ky. 1956).
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than substance. This is undoubtedly within the judicial license,
though this license should be used sparingly and limited to exceptional
situations as perhaps it was here.
Regardless of the above inconsistency, the effect of the loan agree-
ment decisions is obvious. It not only allows an insurer owning a part
of a cause of action to avoid joinder, but the insurer owning the bene-
ficial interest in the whole cause of action is permitted to escape the
rule that he and only he can bring the action.
Real Party in Interest Rule Versus Jury Prejudice
It would be difficult to argue in any of the above three situations
(full assignment, partial assignment, or loan agreement) that the in-
surance company is not a real party in interest since it is the party
"who will be entitled to the benefits of the action upon successful
termination thereof."' Nevertheless, the effect of the full and partial
assignment decisions has been to bring their rules in direct conflict
with Kentucky's well established and rigidly adherred to policy
against disclosing the fact of insurance to the jury.19 Despite many
attempts by attorneys to interject such information into the trial, the
Court of Appeals has held, with few exceptions, that the interjection
is prejudicial and erroneous,20 making no distinction as to which party
it harmed.21 This judicial attitude is predicated on the theory that in-
surance is not relevant to the issue or issues in the case and the belief
that juries will be unjustly influenced against the party insured.
22
Nevertheless, in subrogation cases, the trial courts suddenly find them-
selves naming in an action a party whose presence has been a well-
kept secret for years in the interest of justice.
Requiring that all actions must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest is doubtless a rule to protect the rights of the
defendant, but when action by the plaintiff insured, brought at the
insurer's request for all damages sustained will be a bar to any sub-
sequent action by the insurer, it would seem the defendant is ade-
IsTaylor v. Hurst, Trustee, 186 Ky. 71, 74, 216 S.W. 95, 96 (1919). See
also Clay, CR 17.01 at page 206 for a discussion of the real party in interest rule.
19 Gayheart v. Smith, 240 Ky. 596, 42 S.W. 2d 877 (1931); Bybee v. Shanks,
253 S.W. 2d 257 (Ky. 1952); Warren's Admr. v. Smith, 288 Ky. 833, 157 S.W. 2d
308 (1942).
21 In addition to cases cited in note 19, supra, see recent cases of Thurmand
v. Chumbler's Adm-x., 287 S.W. 2d 908 (Ky. 1956) and Wright v. Kinslow, 264
S.W. 2d 673 (Ky. 1954).
2
1 Wright v. Kinslow, supra note 20, was an action by an automobile driver
and his passenger based on personal injury and property damage where the coult
held that the fact that the plaintiffs were partially insured against loss had no bear-
ing on and was not relevant to any material issue in the case. Therefore, it was
error for the jury to be informed of the existence of such insurance.
22Tbid.
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quately protected. To go further and insist upon open participation
by the subrogated insurer adds nothing to the defendant's protection
but enables him, the alleged wrongdoer, to have plaintiff's insurance
interjected and thus prejudice the jury against the latter.
Consider the effect of these two rules pertaining to full and partial
insurance assignments in the not unusual automobile accident litiga-
tion. The existence of plaintiff's collision insurance may be known to
the jury, where due to subrogation he becomes a real party in interest,
while the defendant's liability insurance, protecting him against
liability, is excluded from disclosure by the above discussed policy
against disclosing insurance to the jury. Although defendant's liability
insurer is as much concerned over the outcome of the litigation as
plaintiff's collision insurer, defendant's insurer, under the terms of the
usual contract, neither pays out nor owes anything until the loss is
placed upon the defendant by adverse judgment, and thus cannot be
named in the action.23 Consequently, requiring the subrogated insur-
ance company to bring or join in the action as a real party in interest
not only contravenes the insurance non-interjection policy but raises
inequities where another insurance company is involved but not join-
able.
Conclusion
The conflict between the evidence rule and the real party in interest
rule is apparent and, as pointed out, can be avoided at the present
only through use of the loan agreement. It is argued by some that
when and if the two rules go before the Court at the same time and
are evaluated that the evidence policy should yield because of its
obsolescence. These proponents maintain that insurance is now a com-
mon commodity and is present in almost every personal injury and
property damage situation, and that putting its existence over to the
jury merely confirms an assumption already contained in the jurors'
minds. But with this viewpoint exception is taken by the writer.
Admitting that insurance coverage has greatly increased in recent
years, it is not unreasonable to assume that there still remain a large
number of actions in which at least one of the parties is not insured.
Upon inquiry the Kentucky Department of Safety ventured a calulated
guess that the percentage of insured motorists for both liability and
collision insurance stands at about sixty per cent in Kentucky. With
forty per cent of the motorists not insured, it appears erroneous to say
that a jury assumes the parties to be protected by insurance when a
2 3 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Liberty Natl Bank and Trust Co., 294 S.W. 2d 921
(Ky. 1956).
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few members of the panel itself more than likely carry no insurance.
The day has yet to come when everyone is protected by insurance
against all kinds of injury or damage. Until that day does come there
is little chance of a jury overlooking the joinder of insured and insurer
as plaintiffs together with the absence of any mention of the defendant
having similar protection against judgment.
A second way to meet the conflict, and one more palatable to the
writer than dropping the non-interjection of insurance policy, is the
procedure used in the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Kentucky. In the federal courts under the authority of United States
v. Aetna Gas and Surety Co.,2 4 the insurer, partial subrogee, is a real
party in interest and must join in the action upon motion of defendant.
Accordingly, the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Kentucky, requires such, but, going on a separate trial theory, does
not permit disclosure of the insurance company's presence to the jury
that tries the issues in which insurance is not relevant except when the
insurer is the only real party in interest or when the insured and in-
surer assert their claims separately and are joined. Where the two
join together to seek one recovery, which is the usual situation, the
insurer is not prejudiced at the trial as his interest is communicated
only in the pleading and in the final judgment.25
Finally, a third and more direct method of resolving the conflict
would be to amend the real party in interest rule, Rule 17.01 of the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, to allow actions to be brought
solely by the insured. This was done by the State of New York which
experienced similar difficulty and perhaps even more confusion than
Kentucky over its real party in interest rule.26 Consequently, the
New York Legislature in 1950 amended its rule to include within its
exceptions the following words:
[An insured person, ... which has executed to his insurer either a
loan or subrogation receipt, trust agreement or other similar instru-
ment, ... may sue without joining with him the persons for whose
benefit the action is prosecuted.2 7
As it now stands, insurance companies are protected in Kentucky
from the jury prejudice of which they live in constant fear so long as
the loan agreement is utilized. Since this subterfuge solves the problem
it may be best to leave the matter as it stands. But to permit the situa-
24338 U.S. 366, 12 A.L.R. 2d 444 (1949).
25 Per interview with the Honorable H. Church Ford, presiding Judge, United
States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky.2
6 For a discussion of New York's experience, see Rosenfeld v. Continental
Bldg. Co., 135 F. Supp. 465 (1955).2 N.Y. Civil Practice Act. sec. 210, amendment effective Sept. 1, 1950.
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tion to rest upon a fictitious base and fail to call a spade a spade or an
assignment an assignment seems legally immature compared to New
York's more realistic and direct solution.
Joseph B. Helm
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WHAT AGENCY SHOULD
FIX SENTENCE?
Today the determination of the criminal sentence is not the result
of an automatic application of fixed schedules of fines and prison terms.
It is the result of the exercise of discretion within limits prescribed by
law. This note is primarily concerned with formulating an answer to
the following question: After a finding of guilty or a plea of guilty
to a criminal offense, for which the maximum sentence is not life im-
prisonment or death,' what agency should determine the punishment
for a sane and mature defendant?
Lord Asquith said in the House of Lords on December 16, 1953,
in debate upon a recommendation by the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment: "The wisdom of centuries has committed to juries the
task, and the only task, of ascertaining innocence or guilt. The de-
termination of the punishment has always been lodged in other
hands."2 And the "other hands" have traditionally been the hands of
the trial judge. In the nineteenth century, however, there was mani-
fested in the United States a movement toward technical procedure for
the protection of the accused, and a momentary tendency to transfer
the assessment of the punishment from the judge to the jury. This
may have been the result of a seething reaction against the old English
criminal law as promulgated by the early colonial judges-fanned by
"the Jacksonian dislike for authority," and a "confidence in the ordinary
citizen's adequacy to do any job."3 But whatever the cause, the judges
shrewdly bowed to the spirit of the times, acquiescing in the protective
technicalities with which the accused was surrounded, but regaining
1 In most of those states which have retained the "life or death" sentence,
the jury has been entrusted with the determination of such sentence. For an ac-
counting of the various state laws on this subject, see Andres v. United States, 333
U.S. 740, 757-766 (1948).
2 See Devlin, "Criminal Responsibility and Punishment: Functions of Judge
and Jury, Grim. L. Rev. 661 (Sept. 1954). At common law, the jury either
returned a special verdict, setting forth the circumstances and praying for judg-
ment of the court thereon, or a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. Punishment
was fixed by the court and governed by the laws in force. People ex rel. Bradley
v. Superintendent of Illinois State Reformatory, 148 IM. 413, 36 N.E. 76, 79
(1894).
3 Puttkammer, Administration of Criminal Law 216 (1953).
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